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Project PRIME (an acronym for Priority Management Efforts) Is a short
title for • series of actions concerned with programming, budgeting, and
management accounting developed by Robert N. Anthony, the Assistant Secretary
of Defense (Comptroller). As such, it is a distinct, identifiable part of
the Resources Management Systems effort of the Department of Defense, but only
a part both in timing and content. Its focus is on two main objectives:
(1) the integration of programming, budgeting, and management accounting--
meaning that the information used in these three systems will be entirely
consistent; and (2) the development of more meaningful information on the
consumption of operating resources (as opposed to investment resources)
.
The development of Project PRIME is actually a continuation of efforts
begun as far back as 1949. In that year and the one following, foundations
for the Defense Department's financial management systems were laid by amend-
ments to the National Security Act and by the Budget and Accounting Procedures
Act, growing out of the first Hoover Commission Recommendations. In 1956
Wilfred J. McNeil, the first Comptroller of the Defense Department, worked out
a conceptual scheme called a "Performance Type Budget," which provides a basis
for the concepts of Project °RIME.^
U.S., Department of Defense, A Primer on Project ^RIME (Washington,




Management improvements seem Indicated from the developments cited
above and from the very strong claims made by Charles Hitch, the former
Ass stmt Secretary of Defense (Comptroller):
... we have provided for the Secretary of Defense and
ha principal military and civil an advisors a system which
brings together it one place and at one time all of the
relevant information that they need to make sound decisions
on the forward program and to control the execution of that
program. And ve have provided the necessary flexibility n
the form of a program change control system. Now, for the
-at time, the largest business in the world has a compre-
hensive Defense Department-wide plan that extends more than
one year into the future. And it is a realistic and respon-
sible one—programming not only the forces, but also the men,
equipment, supplies, installations, and budget dollars
required to support them. Budgets are In balance with pro-
grams, programs with force requirements, force retirements
with military missions, and military miss ion 9 with national
security objectives. And the total budget dollars required
by the plan for future years do not exceed the Secretary *s
responsble opinion of what s necessary and feasible.
With th s management tool at his command, the Secretary of Defense
is now In a better position to carry out the responsibilities assigned to him
by the National Security \ct, namely, to exercise direction, authority, and
control over the Department of Defense"— and without another major reorgani-
zation of the defense establishment.
Response to Project PRIME has been varied and is subject to consider-
able resistance in certain quarters of government. The Comptroller General,
for example, is charged with the responsibility of approving accounting sys-
tems. However, since 1950 he has in fact approved only one, that covering
the civil functions of the Corps of Engineers. Whether Project PRIME will
eventually conform to the Comptroller General's standards remains to be seen.
Charles Hitch, Decision Making for Defense (Berkeley: University
of California ^ress, 1965), p. %? &\.
2Ibid.

Congress is skeptical of Project PRIME to the point that it directed
that no changes in the budgeting and accounting system be authorixed until
further large scale tests ire conducted and proven satisfactory. Specifically,
Congress requires that Project PRIME: (1) meet the requirements of all appli-
cable laws governing budgeting, accounting, and the administration of public
funds and the standards and procedures established pursuant thereto; (2) pro-
vide for uniform application throughout the Department of Defense, and
(1) will prevent violations of the Anti-Deficiency Statute (R.S. 3679; 31
USC 665). X
Thus, the arena for Project PRIME has very forceful opponents on each
side. This paper will examine the history of government budgeting with par-
ticular emphasis on recent field tests of 'roject 'RTME. The major question
to be considered is: Will Project "RIME fully achieve the management improve-
ments art! culi ted by the Department of Defense? Closely allied to the primary
ouestion are these subsidiary Questions. Will Project PRIME meet the needs
of managers: (1) Provide systematic programs, including a definition of alter-
natives, and selection of the best alternative; (2) Translate programs into
budgets in an integrated, consistent fashion; (3) Specify responsibility for
a mission or service in terms of organisational units; (4) Measure actual
performance against planned performance; (5) Relate resources consumed to work
done; (6) Provide recurring, Quantitative information regarding actual results
of activities to managers at appropriate levels; and (7) Provide reliability
and consistent accuracy in data?
.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on "xovernoaent Operations, Planning,




THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN BUDGET SYSTEM
Early Financial Practices. 1789-1909
The budget system of Great Britain was not fully developed at the
tine of the American Revolution; hence there was no practical British method
which could be followed by the framers of the Constitution. A major result
was that the Constitution requires only this: "No money shall be drawn from
the Treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law; and a regular
statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of all public money
shall be published from time to time." Beyond this the Constitution requires
2
only that all revenue measures must originate in the House of Representatives.
The requirement for financial reporting was elaborated in the statute
establishing the Treasury Department, which made it the specific duty of the
Secretary of the Treasury to prepare and report estimates of the public
revenue, tnd the public expenditures . . . This was supplemented in 1800
by a statute directing the Secretary "to digest, prepare, and lay before Con-
gress ... a report on the subject of finance, containing estimates of the
U.S., Constitution
. Art. I, sec. 9.
For a description of early financial practices, see Charles Bullock,
'The Finances of the United States from 1775 to 1789," Bulletin of the
University of Wisconsin
. Vol. I, June, 1895, pp. 117-273.
JJesse Burkhead, Government Budgeting (New York: John Wiley and
Sons, Inc., 1963), p. 9.

public revenue and public expenditures, and plans for Improving or increasing
the revenues ..."
In these formative years, Alexander Hamilton assumed 3 strong execu-
tive leadership n all financial matters and prepared estimates of need for
expenditures and revenues. As Henry Jones Ford has written:
In the beginning all branches of the government were bunched
together in their ouarters so that Intercourse was ready and
easy without formal irr uigements, and the brief notices of
the direct presence of cabinet officials appearing in the
records give an inadequate notion of the real extent of the
intimacy. It wis by direct, personal administrative initia-
tive th t the government was set in operation. Only by such
agency could the finances have received the radical treatment
by vhlch Hamilton almost at I stroke lifted the nation out of
bankruptcy, established its credit and secured its revenues.
. . His personal initiative transcended even the function of
an English Chancellor of Exchequer on which it was distinctly
modeled, for he had no other compact party on which he could
depend . *•
In the early years the House of Representatives exercised its functions
of criticism and control through I committee of the whole. n the case of
appropriations, after discussion had been held, a specific committee was
appointed to bring in a bill incorporating the views expressed by the Commit-
tee. However, by 1796 the House procedure was changed. A Committee on Ways
and M^ans was appointed, which was made a permanent standing committee in
1802. This marked the end of continuous executive direction of government's
finances. During Jefferson's reign the separation of Cabinet officials from
the day-to-day work of Congress was made complete. Direct oral communication
between the two branches of government gave way to written communication.
Executive influence in legislation came to operate through and upon the
1Ibid.
Henry Jones Tord, 'Budget Making and the Work of Government,' The
Annuals
. November, 1915, pp. 4-5.

developing committee structure of the Congress, and the executive lost much
of Its foraer initiative in the legislative process. Friction in financial
matters between the Administration and the Congress increased, centering very
often on the use of detailed appropriations to restrict executive discretion.
With the emergence of organised political parties, executive influence
on legislation came to be exercised by the President In his capacity as leader
of a political party as veil as in his capacity as head of the executive
agencies of government. Some critics have viewed this enlarged role of the
Presidency as a development which was not foreseen by the Constitution's
2fathers and as antithetical to their views. In addition, there is evidence
that some of the original members of the House felt thit the Constitution
required the executive's role in financial affairs to be one of reporting only,
and that all proposals which were to be a "project of law* were to originate
with Congress. Nevertheless, it was upon this expanded concept of the Presi-
dency that the budget system eventually came to depend.
Prom 1802 to 1865 both appropriation and revenue authority were con-
centrated In the House Committee on Ways and Means. During th s period the
Secretary of the Treasury continued to present his annual report, and at the
beginning of each session of the Congress, a Book of Estimates jetting forth
the expenditure requirements of the various departments and agencies. The
Secretary '8 function was primarily clerical. He classified the expenditure
proposals and transmitted them to the Congress. He did not criticize, alter,
-Arthur Smithies, The Budgetary Process in the United States (New




*Henry Carter \dams, The Science of Finance (New York: Henry Holt
and Company, 1898), p. 104.

reduce or coordinate the requests. Neither did the Cabinet serve as an agency
for financial planning.
During this period the House Ways and Means Committee served as a
planning mechanism, at leist to the extent of providing an occasion for a
comprehensive view of the state of the government's finances. This view
emerged, however, only as one department after another had been heard. But
beginning in 1865 a separate House Appropriations Committee was established,
and thereafter such unity as had prevailed in Congressional review of the
budget begin to be dissipated.
The period of extreme laxity in federal finance extended from about
1880 to 1909. This wa3 the period when the major financial problem faced by
the Congress was the annual disposition of the large surpluses brought in by
the tariff. This period of financial affairs did not make for a rigid execu-
tive or legislative control over expenditures. It is not difficult to appre-
ciate that a large number of Congressmen were anxious to increase the number
of standing committees with authority over the expenditure of funds so easy
to acauire. Neither is it difficult to understand that this period of Con-
gressional history was characterized by extreme irresponsibility and wasteful
extravagance in the form of ill-disguised raids on the Treasury. As one
critic said, "The remarkable thing is not that the system breeds corruption,
but that it should work at all."2
Vincent J. Browne, The Control of the Public Budget (Washington,
D.C.: Public \ffairs Press, 1949), pp. 50-73.
Henry Jones Ford, The Cost of Our National Government (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1910), p. 60.

Congressional extravagances during the period were matched only by
the profligacy of the executive departments. The practice developed of
incurring "coercive deficiencies.'* Speaking of this, Wilmerding states:
The departments governed their expenditures by the amounts of
the estimates rather than by the amounts of the grants. If
In any case less were granted than was estimated, the depart-
ment or bureau affected, Instead of revising its plan for the
coming year to bring them within the financial limits of the
reduced appropriation, continued them without change in per-
fect confidence that Congress would appropriate supplementary
sums when they were requested rather than stop the service.*
The Taft Commission on Efficiency and Economy,
1908-1912
Two types of pressures converged on the national administration with
the inauguration of President Taft in 1909. The first developed from the
state of national finances, which, even for this prosperous nation, came to
border on crisis. The surpluses of earlier administrations were not as per-
sistent after 1894. Deficits were incurred in two of the four years of Presi-
dent Theodore Roosevelt's second term. In the first year that President Taft
was in the White House, the deficit was $89 million in a total budget of $694
million. Federal expenditures were running between $300 and $400 million In
the 1890*8. By 1909 they were nearly $700 million. 2
Not all of these Increases In expenditure were traceable to graft and
corruption. A much larger part of the increase was due to expanded government
functions and to outlays occasioned by the Spanish-American War.
Lucius Wilmerding, Jr., The Spending Power (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1943), p. 140.
2
U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Historical
Statistics of the United States, 1789-1945 (Washington, D.C., 1949),
pp. 296-299.
x »dj
9A second set of pressures came from the antipathy to the graft and
corruption itself. A number of the persons who had directed their crusading
seal against the malpractices of local government directed a similar zeal
against laxness in ederal administration and corruption in Congress.
The combination of these pressures began to produce some results.
On March 4, 1909 an amendment to the Sundry Civil Appropriations Act provided
that If appropriations exceeded revenues , the Secretary of the Treasury should
Immediately advise the Congress as to how appropriations could be reduced or
additional taxes levied.
However, there Is no evidence that the Secretary of the Treasury ever
acted in conformity with this directive. On March 22, 1909, the Senate
appointed a special committee to investigate the deficits. It reported that:
. . . the application to the business of the government of
improvements in systems and methods similar to those which
have produced the high degree of business efficiency in the
great business corporations of the country will result in
the saving of many millions of dollars annually and in a
much higher degree of efficiency in the conduct of govern*
ment business.
2
In December 1909 President left requested an appropriation of $100,000
"
. . .to enable the President to inquire into the methods of transacting the
public business.
.
»•* This request was granted by Congress on June 25, 1910,
and Immediately thereafter the President appointed the Commission on Economy
and Efficiency.
The Commission conceived Its responsibilities broadly and for two
years undertook investigations of (1) the budget as an annual financial
Burkhead, Government Budgeting , p. 18.
2
Ford, The Cost of Our National Government , p. 105.
Burkhead, Government Budgeting , p. 18.
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program, (2) the organization and activities of the federal government,
(3) personnel problems, (4) financial records and accounts, md (5) business
practices and procedures in the government. One of the first things that the
Commission did was to ecure information from federal departments and agencies
classifying expenditures according to objects purchased, such as personal
services, materials, supplies, and equipment. On the basis of discussion with
department hesds md in consultation with the President, the Commission pre-
pared a set of forms to be used by departments in the submission of annual
budgetary data. In addition, the Commission prepared an organisation chart
of federal government activity, the first that had ever been devised, and made
numerous studies of overlapping and duplicating operations within the
government
.
On January 17, 1912 President Teft sent to Congress a message on
Economy and Efficiency in the (Government Service. On June 27, 1912, the
report of the Commission on The Need for a National Budget was transmitted.*
These two documents were of great significance in the development of the bud*
get system in the federal government and were of almost equal importance in
the improvement of specific government management procedures. This was the
first time in the history of the federal government that its organisational
structure had been studied in detail, and the first time that detailed infor-
mation had been assembled on the character of governmental expenditures. Of
even greater significance was the fact that these documents represented an
U.8., Commission on Economy and Efficiency, The Need For a National




assumption of responsibility by the Chief Executive for financial planning
and for the management of the business of the government.
President Taft's message was devoted to a description of the condi-
tions which had called forth the Commission on Economy and Efficiency, a
discussion of the work of the Commission, and the transmission of the organi-
zational chart which they had prepared. Throughout the document Taft stressed
the importance of establishing a national budget system as an instrument of
executive management and control.
The report of the Commission on The Need for a National Budget was a
similar broad-guaged document. The Commission's report portrayed the budget
as serving a number of purposes—a document for Congressional action, an
instrument of control and management by the Chief Executive, and a basis for
the administration of departments and agencies.
The Commission pointed out that the administrator's responsibilities
could be implemented only when budget expenditures were classified in accor-
dance with the activities undertaken by departments and agencies. To this
end, the pro forma budget incorporated in the report included an itemization
of activity schedules as subdivisions of departmental and agency expenditures.
A significant point of concern to the Commission was the constitu-
tional issue—how a budget system vould fit into a governmental structure
based on the separation of powers. In considering this point the Commission
suggested that the budget system was based on the constitutional theory of
trusteeship. The government is the trust instrument; government officials are
the trustees. Citizens, in their sovereign capacity, are the beneficiaries
and creators of the trust. The President, as the principal government offi-
cial, must be responsible for the budget. He should submit the budget message
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and the summary statements. The heads of departments and 3genci.es should
transmit data to the President; the resident should have responsibility for
prescribing the form of accounts. The Secretary of the Treasury should assist
the President in discharging these obligations. The President *s responsibil-
ity runs not only to the Congress, but to the public at large. The budget is
the only effective means vhereby the President can be made responsible for
getting a definite, well-considered, comprehensive program before the people.
Unfortunately for the development of the budget system, the Congress
did not undertake serious consideration of the President's recommendations.
The elections of 1912 resulted in defeat for ^resident Taft and no action was
taken by Congress on his new budget and budget message.
In spite of the fact that the work of the Commission on Economy and
Efficiency led to no immediate legislation, it had appreciable long-run value*
The prestige of the Commission and the strong interest of the President made
budgeting an issue of national significance. Eventually, the work of the
Commission contributed greatly to the passage of the Budget md Accounting
Act of 1921.
The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921
The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 was the combined product of a
strong retrenchment movement directed toward the federal government and a
reform movement designed to make all government more responsible and respon-
sive. The Congress became as much interested in accounting control as a means
to economy as in the establishment of an executive budget office. Budget




The national budget system eventually became law under ^resident
Harding who said this was: "The greatest reformation In governmental prac-
tices since the beginning of the Republic. 1 ' From this beginning management
improvement was viewed as an important role of government in the budgetary
process.
Performance Budgeting. 1939-1955
During the early New Deal years the government shifted budget emphasis
from expenditure control to a management orientation. This new concept was
termed performance budgeting and made its mark in the reform or the appropria-
tion structure, development of management Improvement and work measurement
programs, and the focusing of budget preparation on the work and activities
of the agencies.
The rapid growth of government activities and expenditures made it
more difficult and costly for central officials to keep track of the myriad
objects in the budget. With expansion, the bits and pieces into which the
objects were itemized became less and less significant, while the aggregate
of activities performed became more significant. With expansion, there was
heightened need for central management of the incohesive sprawl of admini-
2
otrative agencies.
The climb in activities and expenditures also signaled radical changes
In the role of the budget system. As long as government was considered a
necessary evil and there was little recognition of the social value of public




Allen Schick, "The Road to ?PB: The Stages of Budget Reform,"
Public \dainistration Review
.
Vol. XXVI, No. 4 (December, 1966), p. 249.

UBecause the outputs were deemed to be of limited and fixed value, it made
sense to use the budget for central control over inputs. However, as the
work and accomplishments of public agencies came to be regarded as benefit*,
the task of budgeting was redefined as the effective marshalling of fiscal
and organizational resources for the attainment of benefits. This new posture
focused attention on the problems of managing large programs and organizations,
and on the opportunities for using the budget to extend executive harmony over
the dispersed administrative structure.
In 1937 the President's Committee on Administrative Management casti-
gated the routinized, control-minded approach of the Bureau of Budget and
urged that budgeting be used to coordinate Federal activities under presi-
dential leadership. With its transfer in 1939 from the Treasury to the newly
created Executive Office of the President, the Bureau was on its way to
becoming the leading management arm of the Federal Government. The Bureau's
own staff was increased tenfold; it developed administrative management and
statistical coordination functions; and it installed apportionment procedures
for budget execution. Executive Order 8248 directed the Bureau:
To keep the President informed of the progress of activities
by agencies of the Government with respect to work proposed,
work actually initiated, and work completed, together with
the relative timing of work between the several agencies of
the Government; all to the end that the work programs o£ the
several agencies of the executive branch of the Government
may be coordinated and that the monies appropriated by the
Congress may be expended in the most economical manner
possible to prevent overlapping and duplication of effort.
Accompanying the growing management use of the budget process for the
appraisal and improvement of administrative performance and the scientific






accounting to government operations. Government agencies sought to devise
performance standards md the rudimentary techniques of work measurement were
introduced in several agencies including the Forest Service and the Census
Bureau. Various professional associations developed grading systems to
assess administrative performance as well as the need for public services.
These crude and unscientific methods were the forerunners of more sophisti-
cated and objective techniques.
At the clorie of World War II, the management orientation was
entrenched in all but one aspect of Federal budgeting— the classification of
expenditures. Except in isolated cases, the traditional object accounts were
retained though the control function had receded in importance. In 1949 the
Hoover Commission called for .Iterations in budget classifications consistent
with the management orientation. It recommended that the whole budgetary
concept of the Federal Government be refashioned by the adoption of a budget
baaed upon functions, activities, and projects. To bring out this idea, the
Commission gave a new label—performance budgeting— to hat had long been
known as functional or activity budgeting.
In 1949 a further step was taken in the amendments to the National
Security Act. This legislation was significant as an expression of congres-
sional approval for performance budgeting. The Act provided that the budget
estimates of the Department of Defense: "... shall be prepared, presented,
and justified, where practicable, and authorized programs shall be admini-
stered, in such form and manner as the Secretary of Defense, subject to the
1Public Administration Service, The Work Unit in Federal Administra-
tion ''Chicago: 1937), p. 32.
*U.S., Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the
Government, Budgeting and Accounting (Washington: 1949), p. 8.
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authority and direction, may determine, so as to account for, and report, the
cost of performance of readily identifiable functional program and activities
with segregation of operating and capital programs. Its significance wee
enhanced by the establishment of the comptroller function in the armed forces,
with assignment responsibility for implementing the budget reclassification.
The Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950 further encouraged
the extension of performance budgeting in the federal government. Perfor-
mance budgeting vis thu , developed to emphasize what the government does,
rather than the things which the government buys. The focus was to show the
nature of government programs or accomplishments under those programs.
V e second Hoover Commission on the Organization of the Executive
Br mch of Government reviewed and praised the progress that had been made in
the development of performance budgeting and recommended that further steps
be taken in this direction. Hie major recommendations included: (1) That the
executive budget continue to be based on functions, activities and projects
but be redesignated as a program budget; (2) That cost-based operating budgets
be used to determine fund allocations, such budgets to be supplemented by
periodic reports on performance; (3) That accounts be kept on an accrual basis;
(A) That the Department of Defense report military pay as an element of cost
of support activities of an administrative or service nature.
The Committees on Government Operations supported the second Hoover
Commission and certain of these recommendations were adopted in 1956 as









The Planning-Programming- Budgeting System ,
1961-1967
Budgetary reform in the United States has evolved through three
distinct stages, the last of which is associated with the contemporary
Planning- Programming- Budgeting System (PPBS). In the initial stage, the
primary emphasis was on central control of spending and the budget was uti-
lized to guard against administrative abuses. The detailed classification
of objects of expenditure was the main control mechanism. The second stage
was management-oriented. It was concerned with the efficient performance
of work and prescribed activities. The performance budget, officially intro-
duced by the Hoover Commission, was the major contribution of the management
orientation. The third stage is reflected in the planning orientation of the
new PPB system. It had its roots in Keynesian economics and the new technol-
ogy of systems analysis.
The major experiment with the PPBS began in the Department of Defense
in 1961. On August 25, 1965, President Johnson initiated the ''PBS throughout
the Executive Branch, to be supervised by the bureau of the Budget. The PPBS
was designed to enable the government to: (1) Develop its objectives and
goals, precisely and carefully; (2) Evaluate each of its programs to meet
these objectives, weighing the benefits against the costs; (3) Examine, in
every case, alternative means of achieving these objectives; and (4) Shape
its budget request on the basis of this analysis, and justify that request
in the context of a long range program and financial plan.
Schick, Public Administration Review
, p. 243.
2
U.S., President, Public Papers of the ^residents of the United States
(Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and
Record Service, 1965), p. 34.
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The foregoing broadly Indicates the evolution of PPBS in the Federal
Government. The major elements of programming in 1961-1965 were these:
(1) A Department of Defense Five-Year Force Structure and Financial Program
consisting of pro lections of force, manpower, and dollar requirements for
approved programs on weapon and support systems; (2) A process for review
and approval by the Secretary of Defense and his military and civilian
advisors o program-change proposals (PCP's) by the military departments;
(3) Preceding annual budget formulation, a method for reviewing and changing
the five year program; (4) Emphasis in the annual reviews and in PCP submis-
sions on supporting studies in the form of systems analysis; (5) For approved
programs, submission of force and manpower level forecasts and cost projec-
tions by the military department after each calendar quarter; and (6) Progress
reporting by the military departments in both physical and financial terms as
a basis for control of actual performance in accordance with the program.
1. These elements of the Five-Year Force Structure and Financial Pro-
gram were grouped into eight major programs: strategic retaliatory forces,
airlift and sealift, reserve and guard forces, continental defense forces,
general-purpose forces, research and development, general support, and military
assistance. In addition there was separate funding of retired pay. The forces
of the first two programs were treated simultaneously in Defense analysis of
general nuclear war, in recognition that the strategic forces also make a con-
tribution to the "damage limiting mission of the continental defense forces."
Elements of the reserve and guard were reviewed in the mission packages that
they support as well as in the reserve and guard program as a separate entity.
'-Stephen Enke, Defense Management (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-
Hall, Inc., 1967), p. 32.
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The program elements (nearly 1,000 In all) represented the alternative
or complementary means that should logically be evaluated In conjunction with
one another, regardless of the particular military department involved. Some
program elements were these: Titan Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, infan-
try division, destroyers and Army port terminals. Within a major program,
program elements were grouped into several aggregations. For the strategic
retaliatory forces these were: aircraft forces, missile forces, and command,
control, and communications systems and support.
2. TCP's were to be submitted at any time during the year when changes
to the official five-year program were desired or anticipated which exceeded
threshold levels according to a multiplicity of criteria established for
program-element dollar levels, force units, and manpower. One threshold
criteria, for example, was the addition of a new-equipment item exceeding In
investment cost the amount of $10 million in the first program year or $25
million over the entire duration of the program. The use of threshold cri-
teria Is an obvious application of management by exception.
Anticipation of changes exceeding threshold levels required the mili-
tary departments to review their programs frequently.
Simplified TCP's were used to record the five-year program decisions
already made by the Secretary of Defense or to note certain minor changes.
Budget and manpower decision documents thit were in use before the inaugura-
tion of the programming system continued to be used when only the current and
budget years were affected.
The emphasis on functional reviews in such fields as intelligence,
command and control, transportation, medical services, and procurement and
supply programs further reduced the use of PCP's.
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3. The method of reviewing and changing the Five-Year Program included:
(1) an annual review of changes in the mi ii tary- force structure proposed in the
Toint Strategic Objectives Plan of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; (2) Secretary of
Defense force guidance to the military departments at about the beginning of
April based on this review; (3) formal PCP's by the military departments in
April, May, ind June, predicated on the Secretary's tentatively approved force
structure, and (4) review and approval of the PCP's by the Secretary of Defense
and his military and civilian advisors. The aim was to complete this phase by
the end of August, in order to provide the military departments with an
approved program upon which to base their budgets. Budget estimates are sub-
mitted by the military departments in early October, and the Defense budget is
prepared by mid-December. Figure 1 presents a schema of this cycle in 1965
for preparation of the FY 1967 program and budget.
4. These supporting studies in the form of systems analyses were pre-
pared by study groups located in the Joint Staff, the military departments,
and various contractor organizations. Some study subjects have been: the
number of strategic bombers and missiles needed in the next decade for priority
targets, the requirements for airlift and seallft, and the comparative advan-
tages and costs of refurbishing existing items of ground equipment, replacing
them with new equipment, or pushing ahead on development of better equipment.
An indication of the importance accorded to systems was the 1965
creation in OSD of an Assistant Secretary for Systems Analysis, charged with
review of studies prepared by other elements of the defense establishment,
and improvement of their quality. Appropriately enough, the office was organ-




Department of Defense Program-Budget
Process for Preparation of FY 1967 Budget
Source: Stephen Enke, Defense Management (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-
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5. For approved programs, submission of force and manpower- level fore-
casts and cost projections by the military department after each calendar
quarter. These reflected decisions on program changes, current year repro-
gramming, and various minor changes. The update for the December quarter
picked up budget-review decisions.
Forces were projected for eight years, manpower and costs for five
years. To reflect the major phases of the weapon cycle, costs were categor-
ised as research and development, investment, and operating. This categor-
ization plainly displayed the costs involved in a decision to produce and
deploy a weapon system, as contrasted with the cost of its development. Costs
were also stated in terms relatable to budget-appropriation accounts, thus
making it easier to translate programming to budgeting decisions.
Programming-budgeting correlation was enhanced by the use in program-
ming of the same financial measure aa in budgeting- total obligational author-
ity; budgeting requires in addition the determination of requirements for new
obligational authority to augment prior-year funds already available.
Although the use of obligation rather than cost figures was not in accordance
with the second Hoover Commission recommendations on cost-based budgeting and
accrual accounting, subsequently adopted in Public Law 34-863, the feasibility
of a programming operation was increased by conforming to budget usage.
6. Progress reporting by the military departments in both physical and
financial terms as a basis for control of actual performance. This was the
least developed part of the programming system.
The major differences between programming and pre- 1961 budgeting were
2
these:





1. Programming emphasized the products of defense activity, such as
an armored division, whereas budgeting was in terms of appropriations, such
as procurement, military personnel, and operation and maintenance.
2. The structure in programming permitted analysis of competitive or
complementary programs (for example, Minuteman and Polaris missile systems)
without direct concern with service roles and missions. Competition was
engendered on a program by program basis within borad mission areas rather
than on a service share of the budget basis.
3. In programming there was a longer-term view than in budgeting.
The objective in programming was to determine the total cost implications of
current approvals; this is particularly significant for missile systems and
other major hardware programs involving research and development, investment,
and operating costs over a period of five to ten or more years.
4. Central to the programming approach was the encouragement of
thinking on alternative program possibilities; new programs competed with the
old. In budgeting there tended to be a concentration on the justification for
change--established programs and levels were carried along from year to year
with relatively little justification required. -rorn time to time there were
efforts made in budgeting to get a "zero base," in which it was assumed that
past expenditures of runds did not create a justification for future expendi-
tures. The complexities of budgetary costing generally defeated such efforts.
5. In programming, physical and financial data were secured and main-
tained on a program by program basis, thus facilitating the application of
systems analysis; in budgeting, military requirements were generally developed
by military planners for the force m a whole and translated into dollars.
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This budgeting practice made especially difficult the marginal analysis by
program, a principal feature of systems analysis.
6. Programming emphasized the rational aspects of decision making;
budgeting, the tactical aspects of obtaining funds.
7. Programming decisions were made over a longer period of time than
were budget decisions. The periodicity of budget formulation, however, led
to a similar periodicity in programming submission and review, though osten-
sibly not to the hectic rush characteristic of the final weeks of budget review
(this is not always completely true in actual practice).
The programming system, with its attendant emphasis on systems analy-
sis, provided the factors that C. J. Hitch and other protagonists considered
necessary for the making of the crucial decision, particularly decisions on
forces and weapons. These factors include knowledge about the availability
of alternatives in terms of their military worth in relation to their cost,
projections of costs over period of years, and data organized in terms of
programs. The process proved especially effective in regard to the planning
and control of advanced- technology weapon systems (missiles, aircraft, command
and control systems, and so on).
Through this system "budgets are balanced with force requirements,
force requirement with military missions, and military missions with national
security objectives.' Although budgets may have been in balance with Defense
programs as approved by the Secretary of Defense, they did not cover all the
programs advanced by the services; thus differences of opinion as to the
adequacy of budget levels remain significant.




Although generally successful, the Defense programming system has had
some shortcomings: 1
1. Data generation and review and approval procedures of the combined
programming*budgeting process were excessively burdensome. A complex program-
ming process h ?d been superimposed on a budgeting process that Itself had long
been in need of major improvements.
2. The translation of program decisions to budget terms, and budget
decisions to program terms, was in some areas difficult to accomplish either
quickly or accurately because of structural differences and data limitations.
Specifically, the translation is difficult because programs are expressed in
terms of missions (outputs) whereas budgets are expressed in terms of resources
(inputs). Figure 2 illustrates the differences in budget terms and program
terms. A related program existed in the follow through on programming deci-
sions at the several stages of implementation.
3. Cost estimates for some program elements were limited in accuracy,
involving many prorations and redistributions.
4. The programming structure, little changed from the form in which
it had originally been introduced, proved less than fully suitable.
In summary, PPBS is a planning orientation which departs from the
earlier, now outmoded, rederil budget design that was shaped by the desire to
safeguard appropriations. This system should aid the government in deciding
how to allocate scarce resources efficiently among the over- increasing number






Air Force Operating Costs 1966
Program and Budget
Source: U.S., Department of Defense, A Primer on Project JRIME (Washington,
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THE NATURE OF THE PROJECT PRIME SYSTEM
The Scope of Project PRIME
The Department of Defense has further developed financial manage-
ment systems to include the operating management of resources. This effort
is identified as the Resources Management Systems and is focused on:
(1) Resources (manpower, real property, weapons,--equipment, services, mater-
ials, and supplies); (2) Management of such resources (planning, budgeting,
acquisition, use, consumption, storage, and disposition); and (3) Systems
(they involve recurring, orderly cycles of planning, reporting, md feedback
information). Figure 3 depicts the DOD management process.
Project PRIME (an acronym for Priority Management Efforts), as noted
earlier, is the name given to that part of the Resource Management Systems
which seeks to revise the programming system, the budgeting system, and the
management accounting system so tbit they will be more useful to managers at
all levels. Project PRIME was to have been implemented on 1 July 1967 but
has been deferred by Congress to provide additional time for adequate system
development.
*U.S., Department of Defense, A Primer on Project PRIME (Washington,






Department of Defease Management Process
Source: U.S., Department of Defense, A Primer on Project 'RIME (Washington,






As discussed in Chapter I, the programming system established in the
Department of Defense in 1961 was titled the Five Year Defense Program. This
system permitted cost/effectiveness analysis and a means of assigning resour-
ces to different parts of the defense program.
The experience gained thus far indicates that five points are of
substantial importance in improving the DOD programming system: (1) Dis-
tinguish between independent and dependent programs, or between force-related
and support programs; (2) Show in the program a great amount of detail for a
long period ahead for the independent portions, but less detail for the depen-
dent portion; (3) Show the total cost of decisions to reflect both capital
co :ts and operating costs; (A) Focus on expenses for the operating portion of




To accomplish these objectives Project PRIME includes changes in tx*o
categories: program structure and programming procedures. The structure
changes are designed to provide better program categories and to establish
program priorities. Costing is basically divided into investment costs for
procurement and construction and operating costs for organizational entities,
e.g., smiadrons, battalions, etc. Figure 4 illustrates the distribution of
the 1965 program. As can be seen, the principle changes occur in the so-
called dependent programs which are now closely aligned with discrete organi-
zational functions.
^U.S., Department of Defense, A Primer on Project PRIME (Washington,





Department of Defense Revised Program Structure
Source: U.S., Department of Defense, A Primer on Project PRIME (Washington,
D.C., April, 1967), p. 34.
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Department of Defense Revised rogram Structure













Defense orces 1.7 2 General Purpose Forces 18.2
General ">urpose Forces 18.8 3 Specialized Activities 1.5
Airlift/Sealift Forces 1.5 4 Airlift/Sealift 1.9
Reserve and Guard Forces 2.0 5 Guard and Reserve
Forces 2.0
Research and Development 5.0 6 Research and Develop-
ment 5.0
General Support 14.4 7 Logistics 5.4
Retired "ay 1.4 8 Personnel Support 5.9







The major programming procedure changes include: (1) A procedure to
isolate and permit resolution of key issues of the Major Force Oriented
Issues early in the dec ision-making cycle; and (2) Modifications in the
Program Change Request (PCR) procedure to facilitate submission of PCR's when
there is a need for a decision that cannot be deferred until the next annual
cycle (the term Program Change Proposals noted in Chapter I has been super-
seded by the term Program Change Request).
Budgeting System
The Department of Defense budget is submitted to Congress in five
categories: military personnel, operation and maintenance, procurement,
construction, and research and development.
Project PRIME introduces several changes in the budgeting process in
addition to the reviaed program/budget/account structure. The significant
changes include: (1) Uniform functional classifications below the program
element level; (2) The basic distinction between independent and dependent
programs will determine the timing of review; and (3) Discontinuing the
prorating of shared operational support costs, in combination with the uni-
form account structure, will provide a measurable cost basis for the formula-
tion of programs /budgets. Figure 5 shows examples of the revised structure.
Also, it is hoped that the Congress will endorse a single operations appro-
priation to enable the use of one single system of accounts for appropriation






Department of Defense Uniform
Expense Account Structure
Source: T .S,, Department of Defense, A Primer on Project PRIME (Washington,













3. Maintenance of Materiel
4. Property Disposal
5. Medical Operations
6. Overseas Dependent Education
7. Personnel Support
8. Base Services
9. Operation of Utilities
10. Maintenance of Real Property
11. Minor Construction
12. Other Engineering Support
13. Administration




5. Travel of Personnel
6. Transportation of Things
7. Utilities and Rents
8. Communications
9. Purchased Equipment Maintenance
10. Printing and Reproduction










The existing accounting systems are focused on funds allotted without
any attempt to account for cost of resources used, when they are used, or to
relate these costs to work done. Thus the total costs of a program can only
be estimated.
The basic accounting system change in Project PRIME is to shift to
expense accounting. This transition represents an evolution from the
economics-oriented approach of C. A. Hitch, the former Assistant Secretary
of Defense (Comptroller), to his successor R. N. Anthony, who is oriented
to a financial management approach. The major changes involved are:
(1) Charge the cost of military personnel to the program or unit where they
work; (2) Separation of expense (current consumption) items from investment
(long lived, capital) items; (3) Extension of working capital funds so that
operating expense accounts reflect only the expense of items consumed; and
(4) Development o •" a uniform expense accounting structure to provide a common
basis among military departments to report expense by operating expense bud-
get entity, program elements, functional activities, and types of resources
consumed.
It is planned that the operating expense report will be a principal
tool for management control. Actual costs can be compared to budgeted costs
and variances highlighted. At the unit level responsibility centers will be
provided budgets and reports for management control. The rationale in deter-






Investment Cost Decision Diagram
Source: U.S., Department of Defense, A Primer on Project PRIME (Washington,




































Aid to Minagar a
The manager's role in operations is essentially to see that his
assigned job gets done well and at a minimum cost. The changes in the new
system are intended to facilitate this job. They are meant to support opera-
ting managers throughout the chain of command. The system designer builds
the system, but the operating manager uses it; this is the fundamental
distinction.
Project PRIME changes should give the manager a much better basis
from which to mike budget estimates. Most important among the changes is the
inclusion of the full measurable cost of operating activities in the operating
expense budget. Now the manager will know lust what it costs to operate his
activity, nnd will be able to measure the program effects of an increase or
decrease in his level of activity. This should assist him in deciding to
expand or contract his effort, and in supporting those decisions quantita-
tively. 2
The new system permits flexibility in the use of resources. The
managers should be encouraged to think about the best balance between military
personnel, civilian personnel, and contract personnel, or the optimum degree
of mechanization in wide variety of situations. With the financial segre-




^Robert M. Anthony, "Will PRIME Close the Resources Management
Loop?," Armed Forces Management , June, 1967, p. 47.
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With Project PRIME there should be a tendency to move in the direction
of control of aggregates and away frora control by bits and pieces. As titae
goes on, there should be less emphasis on individual items of expense—less
detailed control of manpower, and less detailed consumption rules for example--
and more emphasis on expenses as a whole.
Finally, Project PRIME should motivate managers to be more concerned
about the use of resources. Managers do need to know how efficiently their
subordinates are performing their assigned missions and the new system should
help them learn this. It should, moreover, motivate managers to be more con-
cerned with the wise use of resources, and therefore lessen the need for
exhortation, inspection, specified constraints, nd other devices that are
now used as a substitute for built-in motivation.
2
As discu sed earlier Project PRIME was scheduled for implementation
on 1 July, 1967. During FY 1967, the three military services conducted tests
to determine how to implement the expense accounting system; the Navy portion






MILITARY SERVICE TESTS OP PROJECT PRIME, FY 1967
The Department of Defease conducted military service tests of Project
PRIME during FY 1967 on a Halted basis. The Air Force test, called Project
FIRM, was conducted at Laughlin Air Force Base in Texas, the Navy test was
conducted at the Naval Air Station, Quonset Point, Rhode Island, and the Array
test was conducted at Fort Carson, Colorado. Only the Navy test will be dis-
cussed in this paper.
Navy Project PRIME Test. FY 1967
The selected concepts tests at the Naval Air Station, Quonset Point,
Rhode Island were: (1) Substituting, at the station, a single allotment-
Expense Operating Budget (EOB) for all operations and maintenance activities
encompassing the O&MN, APA, and MPN appropriations and budget projects;
(2) Accounting for, and reporting on, resource consumption within the single
EOB on an accrual expense basis; (3) Relating the accrued expenses of resources
consumed to mission performance through locally identified and defined statis-
tical work measurement units; (4) Budgeting and charging for services rendered
by a significant service unit on the station and consumed by other organisa-
tions on the station; and (5) Maintaining multiple allotment obligation
accounting records at a higher command level.
Peat, Marwick, Livingston and Company, Report on Resources Management





The test incorporated five major innovations relative to conventional
allotment accounting, budgeting, and reporting for the operation and mainte-
nance of selected air station activities. These innovations were: (1) Orien-
tation of expense accounting and budgeting to station management organization
rather than to appropriation lines; (2) Inclusion of all consumable operating
resources in the budgeting/accounting/reporting process; (3) Use of indepen-
dent work measurement factors as an index of financial performance; (4) Use
of an accrual basis in accounting and budgeting, Including a working capital
fund concept to hold out-of-period costs in suspense and to reflect receiv-
ables/payables cut-offs; and (5) Total integration of budgeting/accounting/
reporting information on data processing equipment. The expense operating
budget and performance statement formats are shown in Figures 7 and 8.
The following table illustrates the lack of total control of resources
2






Personnel $10,730 54% $19,726
Material $ 1,403 21% $ 6,696
Services $ 3.945 100% $ 3.945
TotU $16,078 53% $30,367
Of the changes effected by the EOB, the restructuring of budgeting,
accounting, and reporting to an organisational basis was particularly
1Ibid., p. 7.
Robert N. Anthony, Will PRIME Close the Resources Management Loop,"




NAS Quonset Point, Rhode Island
Expense Operating Budget
Source: U.S., Department of the Navy, Office of the Comptroller,
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NAS Quonset Point, Rhode Island
Performance Statement
Source: U.S., Department of the Navy, Office of the Comptroller,
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significant. Secause It had no direct relevance to the station* s operating
control structure, the previous system of budget project funding tended to
consolidate financial responsibility and authority at the command level. By
taking the station's internal structure, rather than its relationship to
higher authority levels, as its primary point of departure, the ROB provides
a framework through which responsibility and authority can be divided into
manageable, centrally controlled pieces, with an immediate result that can be
measured in terms of broader comprehension of, and participation in the
stations financial management process.
The concept of full costing of resources had two principal impacts:
(1) emphasi.i was placed on controlling expenses, as opposed to obligations;
and (2) consumption resources (expense elements) were freely Interchangeable
to effect the most efficient and economical mix to achieve workload
accompl i shment
.
Approximately forty per cent o~ the station's effort, on a dollar
basis was converted to an acceptable work measurement structure and approxi-
mately twenty per cent was not suitable for this type of measurement. The
balance of measurable activity, approximately twenty- five per cent, requires
a review to determine whether a more appropriate basis exists; fifteen per
cent was not measured.
All BOB transactions were converted to an accrual basis, which was
fundamental to a proper matching of costs and work performance. This conver-
sion did not significantly change HAS Quonset Point's accounting procedures.




Approximately eighty-two per cent of EOB expenses previously had been accounted
for on an accrual basis.
Complete integration of budgeting/accounting/reporting information on
data processing equipment was effectively accomplished. In meeting the system
parameters, data processing completely mechanized all input to the cost ledgers
and all budget/actual comparison reports. Month-end closing time was reduced
by approximately one week. Eventually, this automation may increase the avail-
ability of Comptroller Department personnel for performing analytic as opposed
to paper processing functions.
However, viewing the test from the organizational level of the Command-
ing Officer, it was evident that many of the planning and management decisions
affecting NAS Quonset Point workload were influenced by higher levels of
authority. Moreover, there existed many directives, memos, and operating pro-
cedures, both internal and external to the Navy, that seriously restricted the
Commanding Officer's ability to reduce expenses rapidly when workload dimin-
ished. Similar restrictions prohibited him from reallocating resources between
2
cost centers as their respective workload fluctuated. A few examples follow:
* Carrier and squadron deployment to or from the station caused
the primary fluctuation in department workloads and was determined
by other commands.
* Civilian payroll and personnel ceilings were established by
the Air Systems Command.
* The workload level of the Supply Department was primarily
governed by squadron deployment, O&R activity levels, and South
East Asia demands. Even the level of activity in the O&R






* Enlisted personnel with certain ratings, >uch as quartermaster
or gunners mate, mist be assigned to specific duties.
' Sixty days notice vas required to release civilian personnel
who, in turn, bad seniority rights to qualify for other positions.
Thus, it was difficult to attain quick turnaround time in reducing
civilian personnel expenses when workloads decreased.
* Quotas were established elsewhere for staffing such personnel
as those of the Youth Corps.
* It vas necessary to screen civilian availability lists provided
by discontinued activities in the process of employing additional
personnel.
* Prices of consumable materials were established elsewhere, and
the Commanding Officer was usually not in a position to negotiate
them.
Within the framework of this test environment one of the most basic
needs was a summary document—a Management Report— to highlight financial
position, performance variances and current and future operating trends.
This management data is a summary ''talking" document and complements the EOB
reports. An example of this Management Report is shown in the Appendix.
The Department of Defense was aware that the job of testing was not
complete, and that many obstacles remained, but nonetheless rushed for Imple-
mentation on 1 Tuly, 1967. However, during June 1967, Congress became aware
of the incomplete testing and voiced strong disapproval of Project PRIME and
directed the Department of Defense to further test and improve the sy tern
2during Fiscal Year 1968— as will be discussed in the next chapter.
1Ibid., pp. 25-26.
2U.S., Congress, H
ment System , H. Rept. 349, 90th Cong., 1st sess., Tune 9, 1967, p. 3.
ouse, Committee on Appropriations, Resources Manag<

CHAPTER IV
CONGRESSIONAL CRITICISMS OF PROJECT PRIME
Inadequate System Field Testa
On June 9, 1967 the House Cocamittee on Appropriations decided that the
Project PRIME system should not be implemented as planned on 1 July, 1967. One
of the major reasons for this decision was that the Fiscal Year 1957 tests had
been conducted on a small scale and each service used different principles in
testing.
On 4 August, 1967 the Senate Committee on Appropriations concurred
with the House action and directed that no funds be authorized to implement
2
Project PRIME. The House and Senate agreed that Project PRIME should be
tested further not to exceed one major command per military Service. The
Congress thus felt that with a year's test experience on a larger and more
uniform sample, the Department would be better equipped to justify a change
if such were to be proposed, but not earlier than Fiscal Year 1969.
Lobs of Control in Large Appropriations
In April 1967 the Defense Comptroller, Mr. Anthony, prepared a draft
of a proposed change in appropriation structure to conform to program
1Ibid.
2u.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Resources
Management System
.




categories. This proposal net with considerable Congressional resistance and
was never formally submitted.
On August 18, 1967 Senator Stennis made a strong stand on this issue
in favor of continuing the existing appropriation categories, e.g., pay and
allowances, operating forces, etc. Re felt that the proposed system would
cause Congress to lose control in such large appropriations. Also, Senator
Jackson indicated that he and others favored the existing appropriation cate-
gories for review and control of the Defense budget. The climate in Congress
seemed to be thit they did not want any quick drastic changes to their normal
2
way of reviewing budget requests.
Adequacy of Accounting and Budgeting Systems
On August 21, 1967 the Congress amended H.R. 10738 to require that
the Comptroller General, after consultation with the Director of the Bureau
of the Budget, certify that the Resources Management Systems, Project PRIME
meet three specific standards before they are tested, installed, or utilised.
The three standards are: (1) Does the system meet the requirements of appli-
cable laws with respect to the budgeting, accounting and administration of
funds?; (2) Is the system designed and developed for uniform application
throughout the Department of Defense?; (3) Is the system adequate to provide
for a strict enforcement of the anti-deficiency statute?
U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on National Security and Inter-
national Operations of the Committee on Government Operations, Hearings on
Planning-Programming- Budgeting
. 90th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D.C.
:





This action reflected the concern of Senator Stennis that Congress
should not endorse the Project PRIME system without further system development.
The strong language used in H.R. 10738 makes it clear that Congress intends to
resolve sll major uncertainties prior to implementation.
Too Much Too Soon
The Bouse Committee on Appropriations seemed to sum up the feeling
of Congress on the subject of Project PRIME—too much too soon. Congress
felt that while it was true that changes in the budget and accounting system
should be accomplished, this massive change would temporarily diminish Con-
gressional control and did not permit adequate Congressional expression.
Congress will consider approval of the new system for the 1969 budget
if the system is certified by the Comptroller General and reported favorably
to Congress by May 15, 1968. In this regard it is interesting to note that
the GAO has approved of only one system in the last thirteen years, that
covering the civil functions of the Corps of Engineers. With this background
it is not at all certain just when GAO will approve the Resources Management
2
System, Project PRIME.
1U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Resources
Management System , H. Rept. 349, 90th Cong., 1st sess., June 9, 1967, p. 3.
2
U.S., Congress, Senate Subcommittee on National Security and Inter-
national Operations of the Committee on Government Operations, Hearings on
PI inning- Programming- Budgeting , 90th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, August 23, 1967), p. 63.

CHAPTER V
MILITARY SERVICE TESTS OF PROJECT PRIME, FY 1968
As has been described in the previous chapter, Project PRIME effort
received a temporary setback by Congress in Tune, 1967, but fortunately author-
ity was provided to continue the tests on a larger scale during FY 1968 to gain
additional operating experience and system refinement. Accordingly, the
Department of Defense designated service tests at the following commands: the
Sixth Army; the Naval Air Training Command (CNATRA) ; the Marine Corps Schools,
Quantico; and the Air Force Training Command. As in Chapter III, only the Navy
test will be examined in this paper.
Navy Project PRIME Test. FY 1963
The selection of the Naval Air Training Command located at the Pensa-
cola Naval Air Station as a test site was made because it is at the suballoca-
tion level and is a major claimant for funds from the Chief of Naval Operations
(CNO)
. Figure 9 outlines the CNATRA command, resources, and program elements.
Figures 10 and 11 Illustrate the CNATRA budget and fund flow. The command lines
for funding within CNATRA are shown in Figures 12 through 14. Figures 15 and 16
depict the OSD and Navy test site funding concepts.
^Robert N. Anthony, "We Must Minimise the Financial Risks," Armed
Forces Management , October, 1967, pp. 103-104.
Naval Air Training Command, Resources Management Handbook , P» 700/1,





Naval Air Training Command
Pensacola, Florida
Navy Resources Management System
Test Command Organization
Source: Naval Air Training Command, RMS Handbook, Pensacola, Florida,
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Haval Air Training Command
Pensacola, Florida
Budget Flore
Source: Nival Air Training Command, RMS Handbook , Pensacolj, Florida,






Naval Air Training Coaraand
Pensacola, Florida
Fund Flow
Source: Naval Air Training Coooand, RMS Handbook . Pensacola, Florida,
































Naval Mr Training Command
Pensacola, Florida
NATRACOM Fund Flow - CNABATRA
Source: Nival Air Training Command, RMS Handbook , Pensacola, Florida,
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Naval Air Training Command
Pensacola, Florida
NATRACOM Fund Flow - CNAVANTRA
Source: Njval Air Training Command, RMS Handbook , Pensacola, Florida,
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Naval Air Training Command
Fensacola, Florida
NATRACOM Fund Flow - CNATECHTRA
Source: Naval Air Training Command, RMS Handbook , Pensacola, Florida,
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Naval Air Training Command
Pensacola, Florida
OSD Revised Funding Concept
Source: Naval Air Training Command, RMS Handbook , Pensacola, Florida,
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Naval Air Training Command
Pensacola, Florida
Navy RMS Test Funding Concept
Source: Naval Air Training Command, RMS Handbook , Pensacola, Florida,
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The specific Project PRIME tasks assigned to CNATRA include the
following: (1) Implement Navy Comptroller Resources Management Systems (RMS)
handbook procedures (NAVSO P-3006); (2) Obtain approval and implement revisions
to NAVSO P-3006 found necessary during the test; (3) Develop and implement
Service Unit Concept for Aircraft Maintenance Department within CNABATRA;
(4) Develop and implement Service Unit Concept for Transportation Cost Center,
NAS Memphis; (5) Develop and implement mechanized performance review procedures;
(6) Investigate feasibility of simulating accounting procedures to charge oper-
ating budget for depot level investment type repairables and aircraft;
(7) Develop and implement Uniform Military Labor Distribution Procedure within
the test command; and (8) Advise the RMS Test Director of revisions disclosed
during the test that should be considered when developing Navy-wide procedures.
The test period was set for one year starting 1 June, 1967 and ending 30 June,
1963.
X
Activity costs are recorded and classified by means of a job order
cost system which Is Integrated with a double entry, accrual accounting system.
All operating costs are provided for in the operating budgets and are accounted
for, including the costs of military personnel services and centrally produced
expense- type material. Military personnel expenses are included in budget and
accounting records on the basis of OSD prescribed standard rates. 2
Reports on the results of operations are submitted monthly through
command channels to CNATRA in the same classification structure as the oper-
ating budgets which authorized the incurring of expenses. Appropriation allo-
cation accounting records are maintained for CNATRA at Navy Department level
1Ibid., pp. 25-26.
2NAVS0 P-3006, Financial Management of Resources , May, 1967, p. 3-5.
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on the basis of monthly financial reports submitted by the various CNATRA
functional commands. The office of the Chief of Naval Material is maintaining
the accounts for the Chief of Naval Operations. External budget and appropria-
tion status reports also are prepared by the departmental offices on the status
of CNATRA* s monthly financial reports.
Accounting for the forty-nine organizational entities which comprise
the test command area has been satellited at the major Naval Air Stations
with n the Command; namely NAS Pensacola, Corpus Christi, and Memphis* Each
accounting activity has a computer capability. It is already evident, how-
ever, thit computer capability at all sites except NAS Pensacola will need to
be expanded. Recognizing this as a potential problem area, a group at the
Nav Compt level was formed to monitor systems and to develop additional equip-
ment requirements as the test progresses and the actual live implementation
deadline approaches.
Expense reports are maintained at the activity level at a job order
level. The job order contains data by functional category, element of expense,
cost center, and any other level needed for both on station and off station
reporting. Job order reports are furnished to local department heads on a
periodic basis during the month. At the end of each month, a cumulative
expense report is prepared for the grantor of the operating budget in the same
format as the budget (by functional category, sub- functional category and cost
account). In addition, a report of expenses by functional category, sub-
functional category and element of expense is furnished to the office of the
Comptroller of the Navy for the Navy Cost Information System. Expense data
1RADM K. R. Wheeler, SC, USN, 'Navy's Test of Project PRIME . . .
A Case Study with a Purpose," Armed Forces Comptroller , January, 1968, p. 5.
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is furnished by special reporting for disposal costs, military personnel
services, and maintenance of real property.
Each activity receiving an operating budget submits an Expense
Operating Budget Financial Report. The original is submitted to headquarters
level for posting to ledgers which are the basis for preparation of the
traditional appropriation status reports. A copy is submitted to the imme-
diate command which issued the operating budget for management purposes.
The report is prepared by fiscal year O&M symbol and contains all the finan-
cial data necessary for preparation of appropriation status reports to
external authorities.
The results of the test during the first half of the FY 1963 indicate
significant progress in purifying the systems for data accumulation and
reporting. In addition, the managers unanimously agreed that Project PRIME
has made them aware of problem areas that had previously gone unnoticed and
unattended, e.g., costing of military personnel and transportation.
As of this writing, the Project PRIME test progress is considered
adeouate for implementation system-wide by 1 July, 1968. However, it is not
expected that all procedures will be completely developed by this date.
Additional work will be required to allocate military personnel costs accur-
ately and to refine quantitative output measures.
The requirement now is to obtain approval of the systems in turn by
the Department of Defense, the General Accounting Office and Congress by
1 July, 1968—no mean task.
1Ibid., p. 8.
2
Interview with Commander William H. Johnson, SC, USN, Project PRIME
Test Special Assistant to the Director of Financial Services, Comptroller of





This paper has examined the development of the modern budget system
to Illustrate the evolutionary changes that preceded Project PRIME.
In 1912, the Taft administration, through the Commission on Economy
and Efficiency, stressed the importance of establishing a national budget
system as an instrument of executive management and control. By the early
1920's, the pressure for federal reform resulted in the passage of the Budget
and Accounting Act of 1921. During this period budget execution was control
oriented. The first priority was a reliable system of expenditure accounts.
The next stage in budgeting came into the open during the New Deal
and reached its zenith more than a decade later in the movement for perfor-
mance budgeting. The management orientation, paramount during this period,
made its mark In the reform of the appropriation structure, development of
management improvement and work measurement programs and the focusing of
budget preparation on the work and activities of the agencies.
The third stream of Influence in the transformation of the budget
function has been a closing of the gap between planning and budgeting by the
emergence of the ?PBS. The PPBS was first introduced in the Department of
Defense in 1961 and Into all of the Federal government in 1965. PPBS is
planning oriented; the accent Is on comprehensiveness and on grouping data




Chronologically, Project PRIME is a current effort by the Department
of Defense to revise the programming oysten, the budgeting system, and the
management accounting system so that they vn.ll be more useful to managers at
all levels. The changes planned include: (1) Focus on operating resources
as contrasted with Investment resources; (2) Integration of programming,
budgeting and management accounting; and (3) Charging operating expenses
including costs of military personnel to organizational units.
The Department of Defense is thus concerned with overcoming long
standing management deficiencies. Planning data are inadequate. They are
suspect because they have no accounting foundation and are derived from
arbitrary allocations. They are not comparable among departments. There is
no way of assuring that the budget reflects program decisions, and no way of
assuring the actual spending is consistent with planned spending.
During FY 1967 the Department of Defense conducted field tests to
determine how to implement the expense accounting system. Although the
Department of Defense was satisfied with their evaluations, Congress objected
to the implementation. The actions of Congress were based on good reasons and
not just to spite McNamara. They rightly viewed Project PRIME as too much too
soon and required further large scale field tests.
The field tests conducted thus far in FY 1968 are promising and it
now appears that Congress will allow full implementation for FY 1969.
Conclusion
Many systems of budgeting have evolved within the Federal government
since its beginning. Project PRIME represents another effort to improve the
state-of-the-3rt of management. The major question to be answered by this
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study tt whether Project PRIME will fully achieve the management improvements
articulated by the Department of Defense.
The major contributions of Project PRIME at this time are: (1) An
acute awareness of management resources responsibility at all levels of
command; (2) Increased visibility to management of real costs; (3) Extension
of budgeting responsibility and awareness to all levels; and (4) A better
financial discipline and better business practices in day to day operations.
On the other h'nd, the present shortcomings of Project PRIME counter
many of the advantages. The most significant constraints remaining are:
(1) Centralised control of numbers, rates or pay grades of military personnel;
(2) Civilian ceilings, controls, bumping' privileges, and use of availability
listings; and (3) Poorly defined output measurements.
Lesser difficulties include: (1) Inadequate staffing for analysts at
field activities; (2) Overlapping management reports; and (3) Limited ADP
capabilities at certain field activities.
Prom the foregoing, it is the author' 3 opinion that Project PRIME has
provided many significant benefits, but has not fully achieved all of the
management improvements intended by the Department of Defense. Short of this,
however, the new system does encourage managers to think about the cost of all
the resources they ujo, it lessens the need for control of bits and pieces,
and it shifts the focus of responsibility to the manager who uses resources
as contrasted with the manager who supplies resources.
Overall, Project ^RIME contains both good and bad, but the system
does provide net benefits. Therefore, the Department of Defense is justified
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